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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/05/2006

Accident number: 364

Accident time: 09:15

Accident Date: 08/10/2001

Where it occurred: Nova Mambone,
Govuro District,
Inhambane Province

Country: Mozambique

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: JLT

Date of main report: 12/10/2001
Name of source: IND

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
electromagnetic
rocks/stones

Date record created: 21/02/2004

Date last modified: 23/03/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude: 34° 33' 69" E

Latitude: 21° 06' 62" S

Alt. coord. system: Long: 21 06' 616" S

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: Lat: 34 33' 690" E

Map north: [sic]

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate medical provision (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
inadequate investigation (?)

Accident report
The Accident report is derived from an IND database entry that has been translated. The IND
database shadows the limited IMSMA accident provision and so is not detailed.
The Deputy Team Leader was in charge of a marked area with 8.5m width and 25m long
(Block 2), where he had started to work on Saturday, October 6, 2001. That Saturday, he
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completed the first lane to the south along the minefield length. At 06:0 on Monday October
8th 2001, he started working on the second lane, crossing the minefield in a diagonal line,
starting from the East and heading towards the North. [This was not crossing the Block
diagonally, but may have been crossing the mined area that way.] He used a Vallon VMH 1
detector. He completed this lane (missing a mine) and started with the third lane, from West
to East. He made approximately 5 metres in this lane. The soil was rocky, highly metallic and
with dense vegetation, but still he carried on working only with the detector. After he finished
that lane he returned to the second lane, which he had cleared that same morning. He was
walked to the East in order to cut the vegetation of the third lane from another angle when his
left foot stepped on a mine and detonated it. This was a PMN mine. His right foot was
amputated right above his ankle. The Team Leader was at his commanding and radio control
point, 30 metres north, when the victim detonated the mine.
The Victim was placed on “a long spine board in the back of a pick-up truck” and taken into
Zimbabwe for a rendezvous with an air ambulance. That meeting took place 4.5 hours later.
Block 1 had been cleared the week before and finished on October 4th. The deminer doing
this could not carry on demining on Friday because he had contracted malaria and was
undergoing medical treatment at the compound until Sunday. Before he concluded Block 1,
he had found three mines in it and had used mainly the metal detection method. These three
mines were removed and safely destroyed (1 PMN and 2 POMZ). The block was still marked
with tape. He had started the burning of Block 2 so that it could be clearly identified.
The IND report includes a map indicating that the deminer first worked on the edge adjacent
to the finished “Block 1”. Access was via a “safe-lane” only one meter wide. Having cut a first
lane he returned to the “safe-lane” and began clearing a lane adjacent to his first cut. As he
did so he encountered an obstruction and stepped into the lane he had already cleared
(apparently in order to cut undergrowth from the side). He stepped on a PMN that was in a
straight line with the two PMNs found previously, and equally spaced from them.
See also “Related papers”.

Victim Report
Victim number: 468

Name: Name removed

Age: 31

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: More than 4 hours 30
minutes

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
COMMENT
See medical report.
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Medical report
A medical report was signed by a Doctor in Harare, Zimbabwe.
The victim “sustained traumatic amputation of right foot above ankle… He was airlifted by
MARS at 14:30. The medic who attended him ha applied the following medical treatment:
Arrested bleeding with tight crepe bandage
Started intravenous infusion of Ringers Lactate Solution
Started pain control management with Pethidine 50 mgs intramuscularly 4 hourly
Documented all their interventions
On arrived [at the air-lift site] patient was found on a long spine board in the back of a pick-up
truck.
On examination no other injuries were found other than the traumatic amputation of the right
foot. A new line of intravenous infusion was put up and another litre of Ringers lactate started.
Patient was started on the following management:
Oxygen was given at 10 litres per minute via partial rebreather mask
Morphine up to a total of 15 mgs intravenous
ATT 0.5mls intramusculatory stat.
Mandokerf 1g intravenous stat.
Metoclopremide 10 mgs intravenous.
Reinforced crepe bandage to prevent further bleeding.
Transported patient on a spine board with headblocks to South Med Hospital.”

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the victim
trod on a mine that would have been found if adequate clearance methods were being used.
The mine had a large metal signature and was in a predictable position in relation to previous
finds.
The accident report does not make it clear why the Deputy Team Leader appeared to have
been working alone in the minefield, or what PPE or tools he was using. Also, it is not
possible to be sure what happened to the victim after the accident. It seems that the demining
group not only failed to have an ambulance on site, but their medical provision was also
unable to cope. Another demining group had to lend them a medic (see Related papers).
The time taken for the Medevac – the victim only reached the air ambulance four and half
hours after the time of the accident – was too long.
The failure to carry out an adequate investigation is a management failing which implies that
other aspects of the work may not have been carried out in a professional manner. This,
coupled with the inadequate medical provision, leads to the secondary cause being listed as a
“Management/control inadequacy”.

Related papers
In an interview with another commercial demining group active in the region the researcher
learned that the second company provided medical assistance to the victim who was then
transferred by road into Zimbabwe in the back of an unconverted pick-up truck because the
demining group had no ambulance. This version of events was confirmed by others and fits
the recorded data.
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